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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
LAMAR EDWARD KAY and
SELDON CLARENCE DARROW,
Defendants-Appellants.

Case No.
12104

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is an appeal following the conviction of
Seldon Clarence Darrow of the crime of forgery in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-26-1 (1953).

DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT
Seldon Clarence Darrow was convicted of the
crime of forgery in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-26-1 (1953), on January 28, 1970, following a jury
trial. The Honorable Bryant H. Croft, Judge, Third
Judicial District, presided.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits that this Court should
affirm the District Court's verdict.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent agrees with the statement ol
facts set out by the appellant. It should be noted,
however, that the judge asked the jurors if they
would be biased or prejudiced because of their
membership in the L. D. S. Church. There was nc
affirmative response (T. 92). The trial judge also
asked the jurors if they would give more or less
credit to the testimony of a member or employee
of the L. D. S. Church. Again there was no affirmative response (T. 116).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR
BY FAILING TO EXCUSE FOR CAUSE EVERY MOR·
MON ON THE JURY.

The appellant's argument on this point is based
upon a false premise, i.e., that the jurors who were
Mormons had a pecuniary interest in the outcome
of the trial. This premise is false because the jurors
had no chance of ever receiving any pecuniary gain
by finding the appellant guilty of a crime. There
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were no damages or other pecuniary interest involved as there was in Balle v. Smith, 81 Utah 179, 17
P.2d 224 (1932) (juror was stockholder in defendant's
liability insurer), and State Bank of Beaver County v. Hollingshead, 82 Utah 416, 25 P.2d 612 (1933) (juror held
stock in corporate defendant). Both of these cases
were civil suits to recover either damages or the
unpaid balance due on a promissory note. Clearly
]n those cases the jurors had a pecuniary interest
in the outcome of the trial. In this case, however,
there is no possible pecuniary interest to be gained
by the jurors. A verdict of guilty has no bearing
whatsoever on whether or not the L.D.S. Church
will ever be reimbursed.
The premise of appellant's argument is false
for another reason, i.e., even though some Mormons
contribute to the church, they are not investing with
the expectation of receiving any pecuniary gain.
The language in the Church's Articles of Incorporation makes it clear that the objective is to:
". . . acquire, hold and dispose of such
real and personal property as may be conveyed.
to or acquired by said corporation for the
benefit of the members of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints, . . . . " (Exhibit

S-2)

This language merely sets forth an objective of the
Church to refrain from using contributions for other
than church purposes. The members are not beneficiaries of the property, nor are they intended to
be. The members are benefited like an insurance
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policy holder in a stock company who receives th"
benefit of life insurance, but no dividends. The
distinction between jurors who own policies in a
mutual company and jurors who own policies in a
stock company was made in w,eatherbee v. Hutcheson,
114 Ga.App. 761, 152 S.E.2d 715 (1969). The Court said:
"But if it should appear that the company
is a stock company the inquiry would be irrelevant, for in that event the policy-holder
has nothing more than a contract with the
company, giving him no interest in its assets,
and he is no more disqualified than would be a
depositor in a bank that is party to litigation."
Id. at ______ , 152 S.E.2d at 719.

The interest in the outcome of a criminal trial
is not pecuniary gain as the appellant urges. The
issue to be decided is guilt or innocence, and no damages or other monetary interest is at stake. If the
jurors swear impartiality, they cannot be disqualified for an interest so remote as that suggested by
the appellant. Sinclair v. Turner, 20 Utah 2d 126, 434
P.2d 305 (1967). See also; People v. Harris, 64 Cal. Rptr.
313, 434 P.2d 609 (1967), wherein the defendant in a
burglary prosecution who professed to be an atheist
was not entitled to exclude jurors who believed in
God.
The trial court committed no error in refusing
to exclude from the jury members of the Mormon
Church. The jurors swore impartialy and said that
their membership in the Church would not make
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them biased or prejudiced. In fact, the court avoided
reversible error by not excluding Mormons. In
Birmingham Baptist Hospital v. Orange, 284 Ala. 160, 223
So.2d 279 (1969), the Alabama Supreme Court held
that it was reversible error, where there was lack
of bias or prejudice, to sustain challenges for cause
to members of Bapitist Churches which affiliated
with an association which e '"cted hospital trustees
for the defendant hospital. ', ·.e action against the
hospital was for personal injuries received by the
plaintiff as a result of an operation. It was also held
that the:
". . . mere fact that the jurors were Baptists, and members of the Baptist churches
which were affiliated with the Birmingham
Baptist Association, which elected trustees to
manage Birmingham Baptist Hospital was not
a proper ground for challenge for cause." Id.
at 164, 223 So.2d at 279.

Further, it was held in Commonwealth v. Subilosky,
352 Mass. 153, 224 N.E.2d 197 (1967), that the fact that
a juror had an account in or was doing business
with the bank that had been robbed would not be
a basis for disqualification. Id. at 161, 224 N.E.2d at
203. The Subilosky case is directly in point with facts
before this court. In fact, a juror who has an account
with a bank that has been robbed would have more
of a pecuniary interest involved than a jury who
is a Mormon who has contributed to the L.D.S.
Church, which had been the victim of the forgery.
The appellant has failed to show that any preju-

6
dice resulted because Mormons sat on the jury
which found him guilty. The evidence was overwhelming and the appellant was given a fair trial
before an impartial tribunal.
The position urged by appellant is very similar
to that asserted by Joseph White Musser and
others in State v. Musser, 110 Utah 534, 175 P.2d 724
(1946). The appellants in Musser argued that it was
error to refuse to exclude Mormons from the jury
impanelled to try prosecution of appellants for conspiracy to commit acts injurious to public morals by
advising and urging others to practice polygamy.
This Court stated:
"The judge [trial] stated that no one
would be excluded from the jury merely by
reason of church affiliation. On challenge of
some Mormon jurors for alleged bias, on voir
dire examination each of them stated that regardless of the emphatic stand of the Mormon
Church against the advocacy of polygamy, he
would try the case according to the evidence
and the court's instruction. The charge of bias
was not substantiated." Id. at 561, 175 P.2d at
738.

Nor has the charge of bias been substantiated in the
case presently before this Court. Each juror in this
case stated that regardless of his membership in the
Mormon Church, he would try the case according
to the evidence and the court's instructions, without
bias or prejudice.
The respondent asks this Court to affirm the
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appellant's conviction and find that no errors were
committed by the trial judge. The court did not
abuse its discretion by refusing to excuse members
of the L.D.S. Church from the jury. In United States v.
Johnson, 401 F.2d 746 (2d Cir. 1968), the court of appeals ruled that it was within the discretion of the
trial judge to allow a challenge for cause against an
employee of a bank trust department in a prosecution for robbing the bank. There was no error in
refusing to excuse for cause all veniremen who
worked for banks. The court said that "[n]o authority is cited for the prosposition that courts should
excuse jurors on occupational grounds and we see
no reason for such a rule." Id. at 747. See also United
States u. Woods, 364 F.2d 481 (2d Cir. 1966), (jurors had
small Federal Housing Administration insured loans.
Standing alone, it would not affect her ability to
render a just verdict in prosecution for knowingly
making false statements with intent of obtaining
federal insured loans and of influencing action of
Federal Housing Administration); Morris v. Duker, 414
S.W.2d 77 (Mo. 1967), (holder of policy from defendant's insurer is not disqualified as juror as matof law; City of Hawkins v. E. B. Germany f.1 Sons 425
S.W.2d 23 (Tex. 1968), (general rule is that the interest
of a resident, tax-paying citizen of a city is too remote and contingent to render him disqualified to
serve as a juror in a suit in which the city is a party).
There has been no violation of either the federal or Utah Constitution. The appellant was tried
by an impartial jury and cannot now claim that he
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was prejudiced without showing any errors on the
part of the trial court. The conviction should be affirmed.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR
BY REFUSING TO READ CERTAIN REQUESTED
QUESTIONS ON JURY VOIR DIRE.

In Utah, the examination of the jurors is conducted by the judge, but:
"The judge may permit counsel for either
side to examine the jurors, but such examination by counsel shall be limited by the court.
No action of the court under this section shall
constitute error, except in cases of clear abuse
of discretion." Utah Code Ann. § 77-28-1
(1953).

The respondent submits that there was no abuse
of discretion on the part of the trial judge in refusing
to ask certain requested questions on voir dire. The
trial judge has considerable latitude of discretion
as to the manner and form in which he will conduct
voir dire examination to determine the qualifications
of jurors. Utah State Road Commission v. Marriott, 21 Utah
2d 238, 444 P.2d 57 (1968). This discretion includes
the right to refuse to ask questions like those requested by the appellant. (See Appendix A of Appellant's brief, pp. A-3, A-4.) It should be noted here
that the court did ask jurors if they would give more
or less credit to the testimony of a member or em-
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ployee of the L. D. S. Church (T. 116). This question
encompasses the objective of the appellant, even
though the specific requested questions were not
asked. This is especially true since only an employee of the Church testified at the trial. It is completely immaterial whether the jurors believed "that
the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latterday Saints is a latter day prophet, .... " This question nor question number 14 had any relevancy
whatsoever to the issues presented at the trial and
hence, no bearing on the jurors' qualifications to
sit on the jury. The court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to ask these questions.
At the time of the voir dire examination it was
not contemplated by either party that the President
of the Mormon Church would give testimony at the
trial. The question was hypothetical at best, and the
judge correctly refused to ask it. It was held in
Commonwealth v. Lopinson, 427 Pa. 284, 234 A.2d 552
0 967), that examination of prospective jurors:
" ... is to be strictly confined to inquiries
disclosing qualifications, or lack of them, and
not extended so as to include hypothetical
questions, when their evident purpose is to
have the jurors indicate, in advance what their
decisions will be under a certain state of the
evidence or upon a certain state of the facts,
and thus possibly commit them to definite
ideas or views when the case shall be fairly
submitted to them for their decision." 234 A.2d
at 560.

Even though the questions were not requested for
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the purpose of having the jurors indicate their decision, it is still hypothetical in that it presupposes
that the President of the Mormon Church would
testify, when in fact he was not going to testify and
did not testify. Also, tangental questions are not to
be asked. Brundage v. United States, 365 F.2d 616 (10th
Cir. 1966).
There was no abuse of discretion, and the trial
court did not commit error by refusing to ask the
requested questions. The jurors' qualifications were
established by proper voir dire examination. There
has been no showing of abuse of discretion or
prejudice, and the conviction should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
Since no errors were committed by the trial
court, the appellant's Point III is moot. The appellant
was not in any way denied a fair and impartial trial.
The conviction should stand on the basis of the
jury's conclusion, i.e., guilt.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
LAUREN N. BEASLEY
Chief Assistant Attorney
General
Attorneys for Respondent

